I. INTRODUCTION
The atmosphere surrounding the impeachment of President Clinton was more a circus than a serious effort to remove the President of the United States. The reason for that is simple: Very few people-either in the Congress or in the country-really wanted to remove him or thought the impeachment effort would actually result in his removal. Instead, it was a political effort to embarrass Clinton and "send a message" of disapproval: to attach a scarlet letter. But few seemed to assess the potential costs and dangers inherent in such an approach. This article will address whether that is an appropriate use of the impeachment process, whether we can afford such frivolous treatment of the Commander in Chief, and, if not, what reforms are possible.
The article begins by examining the only prior serious attempts to impeach and remove a President of the United States-that of Andrew Johnson in the 1860s and of Richard Nixon in the 1970s. It will show that the approach to impeachment during those efforts was notably different from that exhibited during the Clinton impeachment. Those impeachments were serious efforts to remove the president from office; impeachment was not being used simply to send a message.
The first impeachment of a president occurred with Andrew Johnson in the 1860s. The times were notably different from the exuberance of the 1990s. The country had just experienced the trauma of the Civil War and the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln. Thus, members of Congress and the public presumably understood the need for a full-time, undistracted Commander in Chief and the perils inherent in blithely impeaching and removing him. But the public had little love for Lincoln's successor and his apparent willingness to tolerate the South's newly enacted "Black Codes." Ironically, President Lincoln, a Republican, had asked Johnson, a Democrat, to join his presidential ticket in the 1864 election to unite the country. Suddenly, after Lincoln's assassination, Vice President Johnson, a member of the minority party, had, under the most unfortunate circumstance, become President and seemed to escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade?" Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research ( Dec. 5, 1996) , http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm. 5 
See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Impeachment as a Technique of Parliamentary Control Over Foreign Affairs in a Presidential
System?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1525 REV. , 1528 REV. (1999 (impeachment as a final safeguard, not to be used to resolve disagreements over foreign policy); JOHN R. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 110 (1978) (impeachment process requires serious wrongdoing; removal is too drastic to be used in doubtful instances); Lawrence H. Tribe, Defining "High Crimes and Misdemeanors": Basic Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 723 (1999) (Constitution recognizes the seriousness of impeachment by requiring the Chief Justice to preside over the trial. Impeachment is the only constitutional means by which one branch can overthrow another). 6 
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3 send the President a message, not to remove him from office.
It is hard to imagine such nonchalance in today's post 9/11 world. Today, we are very aware that a substantial percentage of the world's population wishes us ill. We know we need a fully-engaged Commander in Chief. But have we learned enough to avoid a comparable partisan misuse of impeachment in the future?
This article will argue that the nonchalance displayed by members of Congress, especially the House of Representatives, during the Clinton impeachment was wrong then and remains wrong today. The framers of the Constitution had it right-impeachment is a drastic remedy that should be invoked only rarely. 5 As Professor Charles Black noted in his widely-quoted book on impeachment:
The election of the president (with his alternate, the vice-president) is the only political act that we perform together as a nation.... No matter, then, can be of higher political importance than our considering whether, in any given instance, this act of choice is to be undone, and the chosen president dismissed from office in disgrace. Everyone must shrink from this most drastic of measures . . . .
[Removal is] high-risk major surgery, to be resorted to only when the rightness of diagnosis and treatment is sure. 6 In short, impeachment is a drastic measure to be contemplated only as a last resort.
Until recently, the country understood the gravity of the procedure. Impeachment has been utilized sparingly; the first two times the country seemed to appreciate the magnitude of the The Bureau's mission was to assist former slaves in adjusting to their new lives, in part by administering lands that had been confiscated by law from Southern Confederates. JOHN W. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 44 (1902). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 defined national citizenship to include blacks and gave them the right to acquire and hold property, make contracts, engage in ordinary occupations, and testify in court. The purpose of the Act was to render inoperative the Black Codes that were popping up in some of the Southern States. REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 205. I also plan to work with Vicki Jackson on a book on Federalism to be published by the Greenwood Press as part of their series on Constitutional Law. 9 In vetoing the extension of the Freedman's Bureau, Johnson said that he doubted the authority of Congress to legislate for the seceded states, at least not while they were not yet represented in Congress. Moreover, he said, the federal government had no authority to provide for indigents of any race. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (Feb. 19, 1866) 10 In addition to the Reconstruction Act, which imposed military rule over the South, and the Army Appropriations Act, which required that all presidential orders to the army had to go through the General of the Army, Ulysses S. Grant, Congress also enacted the Tenure of Office Act, which provided that all federal officials whose appointments required Senate approval "could be removed only with Senatorial consent."
11 Johnson vetoed both the Reconstruction Act and the Tenure of Office Act, believing them to be unconstitutional, but Congress overrode his 6 vetoes in both cases. 12 Johnson also questioned the constitutionality of the Army Appropriations Act, but signed it nonetheless to avoid leaving the military without funds. 13 After a year of considering a motion to impeach, the House Judiciary Committee voted, 5 to 4, to impeach the President. 14 But, in the next month, December 1867, the full House rejected the motion by a vote of 108 to 57. 15 Given that Republicans constituted a majority of the House, this vote indicates that the rejection was non-partisan. A majority of the House apparently did not believe that policy differences, albeit substantial, with the President constituted "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." proposed replacement of Stanton, but took no action. Stanton, for his part, refused to leave office and armed volunteers stationed themselves outside his office to prevent his forcible ouster. 17 The House offered a resolution to impeach and, within a few days of Stanton's firing, the full House passed the Impeachment Resolution by a vote of 126 to 47, essentially along party lines. 18 The moderate and conservative Republicans, who had opposed impeachment just two months earlier, had finally become convinced by Johnson's firing of Stanton. 19 James Wilson, who chaired the House Judiciary Committee and had opposed impeachment in December, observed:
Guided by a sincere desire to pass this cup from our lips, determined not to drink it if escape were not cut off by the presence of a palpable duty, we at last find ourselves compelled to take its very dregs. 20 The House Resolution to impeach was not specific; only after the vote did the House set up a special committee to draft specific articles of impeachment. On February 29, 1868, the committee reported ten articles to the House. 21 Seven articles were based on Johnson's alleged violation of the Tenure of Office Act. 22 One asserted that Johnson's appointment of Stanton's successor on an interim basis was a "high crime or misdemeanor."
23 Another charge was based on a conversation Johnson had concerning the constitutionality of the provision limiting the 24 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1542-43 (1868); DEWITT, supra note 14, at 380. 25 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1543 (1868). 26 Id. at 1612. 27 Id. 28 
Id.
29 BENEDICT, supra note 16, at 173-74. 30 REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 235. The Radical Republicans knew they were one vote short of the two-thirds needed to convict and concluded that, if they voted on Article XI first, they might get Senator Edmund G. Ross of Kansas as the necessary additional vote. But when they voted, they were still one vote short; they had not gotten Ross. 24 The tenth article, based on Johnson's speech criticizing the Army Appropriations Act, was originally rejected but subsequently adopted. 25 Congressman Thaddeus Stevens introduced an eleventh article which he claimed had been offered in committee and mistakenly omitted. 26 This article, which Stevens described as "the gist of the vital portion of this whole prosecution," 27 described the suspension of Stanton and the reasons offered by Johnson. It went on to accuse Johnson of intending to prevent Stanton from regaining his post in the event that the Senate should decide in Stanton's favor. The article was adopted along with the other ten. 28 The trial began on March 30, 1868 and lasted for more than a month. When the Senate finally began to deliberate on May 16, it was clear that the essence of the case turned on Johnson's firing of Stanton in alleged violation of the Tenure of Office Act. 29 The Senate consisted of 54 members, 42 Republicans and 12 Democrats. That meant that 36 votes were needed to convict. As the Senate began to vote on the articles, it became apparent that those voting to convict were one vote short. Voting first on the article that seemed most likely to pass, Article XI, the House failed to reach the requisite two-thirds. Only 35 Republicans voted to convict; 7 Republicans, joined by all 12 Democrats, voted to acquit. After waiting ten days, they voted on Articles II and III but still failed to get two-thirds. On May 16, having failed to reach the requisite two-thirds majority needed to convicted on those three Articles of Impeachment (Articles XI, II, and III), the Senate voted to adjourn. Johnson had been acquitted, without having had a formal vote taken on the other eight articles of impeachment. To depose the constitutional chief magistrate of a great nation, elected by the people, on grounds so slight, would, in my judgment, be an abuse of the power conferred upon the Senate, which could not be justified to the country or the world. To construe such an act as a high distant misdemeanor, within the meaning of the Constitution, would, when the passions of the hour have had time to cool, be looked upon with wonder, if not with derision. 32 With respect to the tenth article, which was based on speeches made by Johnson, Fessenden wrote:
To deny the President a right to comment freely upon the conduct of co-ordinate branches of government would not only be denying him a right secured to every other citizen of the republic, but might deprive the people of the benefit of his opinion of public affairs, and of his watchfulness of their interests and welfare. That under circumstances where he was called upon by a large body of his fellow-citizens to address them, and when he was goaded by contumely and insult, he permitted himself to transcend the limits of proper and dignified speech, such as was becoming the dignity of his station, is a matter of deep regret and highly censurable. But, in my opinion, it can receive no other punishment than public sentiment alone can inflict. 33 Finally, Fessenden rejected the House Managers' urging that the Senate should heed the clamor of public opinion demanding Johnson's conviction:
To the suggestion that popular opinion demands the conviction of the President on these charges, I reply that he is not now on trial before the people, but before the Senate . . . . The people have not heard the evidence as we have heard it. The responsibility is not on them, but upon us. They have not taken an oath to "do impartial justice according to the Constitution and the laws." I have taken that oath. I cannot render judgment upon their convictions, nor can they transfer to themselves my punishment if I violate my own. And 34 3 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 30-31. 35 Id. at 340. 36 Id. at 328. Another Republican who voted to acquit, Joseph Fowler of Tennessee, also believed that the Tenure of Office Act did not cover Secretary of War Stanton:
The reason for this exception is this: the Senate considered the cabinet officers as the constitutional advisers of the President. They are and have always been regarded as the agents of the Executive. . . . The President has always had the right to select his own cabinet. It is a right guaranteed to him by the Constitution. The legislative department has no power either directly or indirectly to legislate a cabinet minister upon the President, or to remove him save by impeachment. The Senate knew and appreciated this view of the case, and did not desire to touch the long-established doctrine under which the government had flourished.
Id. at 195; REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 246. I should consider myself undeserving of the confidence of that just and intelligent people who imposed upon me this great responsibility, and unworthy of a place among honorable men, if for any fear of public reprobation, and for the sake of securing popular favor, I should disregard the convictions of my judgment and my conscience. 34 The second "respected" Republican Senator voting to acquit, James Grimes of Iowa, agreed with Senator Fessenden that it was improper to impeach Johnson for firing his Secretary of War. In Grimes' view, Stanton was not covered by the Tenure of Office Act and Johnson could justifiably treat it as a debatable question. 35 Grimes concluded:
Nor can I suffer my judgment of the law governing this case to be influenced by political considerations. I cannot agree to destroy the harmonious working of the Constitution for the sake of getting rid of an unacceptable President. Whatever may be my opinion of the incumbent, I cannot consent to trifle with the high office he holds. I can do nothing which, by implication, may be construed into an approval of impeachments as a part of future political machinery. 
SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 721 (1965)
(quoted in REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 247) ("[The impeachment] was managed by a committee led by Benjamin F. Butler and Thaddeus Stevens, who exhausted every device, appealed to every prejudice and passion, and rode roughshod, when they could, over legal obstacles in their ruthless attempt to punish the President for his opposition to their plans. Ben Butler, now uglier and paunchier than ever, employed a device borrowed from Jenkins' ear in 1739: he illustrated an oration on the horrors of Presidential reconstruction by waving a bloody shirt which allegedly belonged to an Ohio carpetbagger flogged by klansmen in Mississippi."). 40 3 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 247; REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 248.
11
friendship and affection, till calmer times shall do justice to my motives, no alternative is left me but the inflexible discharge of duty. 37 Another factor that may have worked in Johnson's favor was the discomfort some Senators felt about the replacement for Johnson. Since Johnson had succeeded Lincoln and there was no existing Vice President, the successor for Johnson would have been the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Senator Ben Wade of Ohio, an ardent proponent of black suffrage. 38 Also relevant may have been the facts that there were only ten months left in Johnson's term by the time of the trial, that Johnson promised to appoint a successor to Stanton who was acceptable to the Republicans, and that the tactics of the House managers antagonized many Senators. 39 Senator James Dixon, a Republican from Connecticut, summed up the lessons from the acquittal:
Whether Andrew Johnson should be removed from office, justly or unjustly, was comparatively of little consequence -but whether our government should be Mexicanized, and an example set which would surely, in the end, utterly overthrow our institutions, was a matter of vast consequence. To you [Fessenden] and Mr. Grimes it is mainly due that impeachment has not become an ordinary means of changing the policy of the government by a violent removal of the executive. President Johnson had considered seeking a Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act, but did not believe time permitted such consideration. As Rehnquist observed: "Given the low esteem in which the Radical Republicans held the Supreme Court of the United States at the time of the Johnson impeachment, and the natural demands for promptness in conducting the trial of the president, it is doubtful that even a prompt effort on [Johnson's] part to test the law would have changed the minds of those senators who voted to convict him." REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 268. 43 REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 244.
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The Johnson impeachment and ultimate acquittal established several important principles. Impeachment would be akin to a judicial inquiry, not simply a parliamentary vote of "noconfidence." Both the House and the Senate rejected the views of those who would have used the impeachment process to turn our system into a parliamentary system. The House members indicated that view in their refusal to impeach in the fall of 1867, when the policy differences were stark but there was nothing that looked like a "high crime or misdemeanor." The House voted to impeach only after Johnson gave them a legally significant wrong in 1868-firing Stanton in defiance of the Tenure in Office Act. But once that threshold was met, the House added other charges, such as Johnson's criticism of the Army Appropriations Act of 1868 (Article IX) and of Congress itself (Article X). 41 The Representatives seemed not to care that it was somewhat unclear whether the Tenure of Office Act applied to Secretary of War Stanton or whether the Act was constitutional. They voted to impeach even though the statute was ambiguous and constitutionally suspect. 42 But they did insist that the President commit a legal wrong before they impeached.
The Senators revealed their views when they rejected the suggestions of Radical Republicans like Charles Sumner of Massachusetts who described the impeachment proceedings as the "last great battle against slavery."
43 In Senator Sumner's view, Andrew Johnson was the 44 Id. 45 
Id.
46 3 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 248. 47 Id.
48 REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 245. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, Sumner's views were reminiscent of Senator William Giles's stated view of impeachment at the time of Justice Chase's trial: "We want your office in order to give it to a better man." Id. But as noted above, that was a minority view rejected in both the Chase and the Johnson trials. 13 personification of slave power. 44 Calling those who had spoken against impeachment "pettyfogging lawyers who did not really understand the meaning of impeachment," 45 Sumner complained:
The formal accusation is founded on certain recent transgressions, enumerated in Articles of Impeachment, but it is wrong to suppose that this is the whole case. . . . It is unpardonable to higgle over words and phrases when, for more than two years, the tyrannical pretensions of this offender, now in evidence before the Senate, as I shall show, have been manifest in their terrible, heart-rending consequences.
. . .[I]
t is important to understand the nature of the proceeding; and here on the threshold we encounter the effort of the apologists who have sought in every way to confound this great constitutional trial with an ordinary case of Nisi Prius and to win for the criminal President an Old Bailey acquittal, where on some quibble the prisoner is allowed to go without the day. 46 In conclusion, Sumner exclaimed: "Next to an outright mercenary, give me a lawyer to betray a great cause." To the latter, it was an essentially judicial proceeding, in which specific charges were made against the accused, just as charges are made against an indicted criminal defendant, and then the Senate sits in judgment as to whether these charges have been proved to their satisfaction. To Sumner, on the other hand, impeachment was much more like a vote of confidence in the government under a parliamentary system. The overriding issue for him was not whether Andrew Johnson had violated the Tenure of Office Act, but whether Andrew Johnson should continue to be president in view of his repeated obstruction of the reconstruction policies of the Radical Republicans. Johnson had one iota of common sense, or one sentiment of public decency, he would have submitted to the decision of the people, and at once united with Congress in settling the great question of the day. He did not, and must abide the consequences. His impeachment when he removed Stanton was a matter of course, and the wonder over it did not last as long as a common newspaper sensation. But behind this lies another fact, which every public man should take notice of: it is that the great business public actually felt a relief when impeachment came. It had been recognized as a fact, though not often spoken out, except by men like Wendell Phillips, that Johnson really was an obstruction to the peace, safety and business of the country. Hence, when there was a prospect of removing the difficulty or settling the question, the great business public felt relieved."). 50 CONG. GLOBE, 40 th Cong., 2 nd Sess., Supp. 411 (1868).
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The Senate rejected Sumner's view. It also rejected the House's view that a technical violation of a constitutionally suspect statute warranted removing the President. All the Senate Democrats and some of the Senate Republicans believed Johnson's actions did not constitute "high crimes or misdemeanors" warranting his removal. As will be shown, these conclusions were to be significant for both the Nixon and the Clinton impeachments.
Thus, while Johnson was not convicted and removed, it seems clear that the whole impeachment effort was a serious effort to remove Johnson from office, not simply to attach a "scarlet letter" and signal disapproval. House members in favor of impeachment really wanted Johnson removed from office and seriously believed it could and would be done. They waited until they could find a legal violation and then moved forward. There is no evidence of House members underestimating the significance or seriousness of the impeachment process. Similarly, the Senators understood the significance of their role. While not happy with Johnson, a majority did not believe Johnson's actions constituted a "high crime or misdemeanor" that warranted removal. Even though the public appeared to support his removal, 49 the Senators decided, but only by one vote, not to convict. 50 So even though the vote was close and Johnson remained in office, there is no evidence of anyone-House, Senate, or public-misunderstanding or misusing the impeachment process. 51 53 The order went first to Attorney General Elliott Richardson but he refused because he had promised Congress upon his confirmation that he would not fire the Independent Counsel except for cause and no cause was presented. Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus also refused for the same reason. Finally, the next in line, Solicitor General Robert Bork, agreed to fire Cox; he had not made such a promise to Congress. EMERY, supra note 51, at 396-99. 54 MANKIEWICZ, supra note 51, at 10.
B. PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON
The effort to impeach and remove Richard Nixon was also a serious, bipartisan endeavor supported by the public. Moreover, it probably would have succeeded if President Nixon had not resigned. 51 To compare the Nixon experience to the Clinton impeachment, we need to recap the events of Watergate. In July 1972, a few months before the presidential election between President Nixon and challenger George McGovern, a burglary took place at the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, housed in the Watergate complex. The apparent purpose of the break-in was to plant listening devices in the headquarters of the Democratic Party. The burglars were not well known, but one was connected with the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP), so the immediate question was whether or not the burglars were directed by or connected to CREEP.
The arrest had little impact on Nixon's reelection efforts; indeed, Nixon was reelected by a resounding majority. 52 However, as the investigation continued, it began to appear that the break-in and the subsequent cover-up may have been organized at a high level in the Nixon Administration. In the summer of 1973, the country, glued to the televised Senate hearings investigating the Watergate affair, learned that the conversations in the White House had been taped by the President. The Special Prosecutor investigating the Watergate affair, Archibald Cox, subpoenaed the tapes. The President refused and ordered Cox fired and ultimately he was. 53 An outraged country dubbed the firing "the Saturday Night Massacre." 54 The House Judiciary Committee announced it would commence an investigation into whether Nixon should be 55 
STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 426 (1990).
56 "In his conduct of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice...." Article I, then listed eight ways in which Nixon had obstructed justice. The Article concluded: "In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States." IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON 57 Id. at 3 (Article II). 58 Id. at 4 (Article III). 59 Id. at 217 (Article IV). 60 Id. at 220 (Article V).
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impeached and Nixon felt compelled to appoint another Special Prosecutor, Leon Jaworski. 55 By July of 1974, the Judiciary Committee had five proposed articles of impeachment on which to vote.
The first article was based on the Watergate burglary and the cover-up. 56 Article II charged that Nixon had abused the power of the presidency by ordering the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to harass his political enemies. 57 The third article concerned Nixon's refusal to honor the subpoenas served on him by the Senate Judiciary Committee. 58 Article IV alleged that Nixon had made false statements to Congress regarding the Cambodia bombing 59 and Article V charged that he had wrongly used public money to improve his home in San Clemente. 60 The House Judiciary Committee adopted the first three articles, by votes of 27 to 11, 28 to 10, and 21 to 17, respectively. It rejected the last two: 12 for and 26 against. The Committee was composed of twenty-one Democrats and seventeen Republicans. As these numbers suggest, the votes on all five articles were bipartisan, with Republicans crossing over on the first three articles to give those a majority and with Democrats crossing over to vote against the last two. 63 Indeed, as noted, it was the likelihood of an impeachment and conviction that led Nixon to resign. 64 What can we learn from this episode? Once again, the approach to impeachment was based on a judicial inquiry model, not a parliamentary vote of "no confidence." The three articles that the House Committee adopted were all based on presidential abuses of power, some of which were also criminal offenses. The objections to Nixon were based on his wrongful behavior, not on any alleged policy disputes. The articles based on his personal misdeeds, such as using the government for personal favors, were rejected. This was similar to the approach used in the Johnson impeachment. Moreover, the support for impeachment in Congress was essentially bipartisan. Finally, the effort to impeach seemed to be supported by the public. 65 
III. THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT That brings us to the Clinton impeachment. A brief reminder of those events is in order.
While it is difficult to know exactly where to start, two events are clearly noteworthy. First, after Clinton became President, Paula Jones filed a sexual harassment suit for actions allegedly taken 66 That was the view I had argued earlier in a letter to the Washington Post. See Susan Low Bloch, Letter to the Editor, Constitutional Balancing Act, WASH. POST, June 11, 1994, at A20 ("It is not a question of 'whether' the president can be sued for actions he took before becoming president; it is only a question of 'when.' 'Temporal immunity' simply requires that suits against a sitting president be stayed until he or she is no longer president.... It is essential to remember this concept of 'temporal immunity' arises from a balancing test-where the damages inflicted by requiring a sitting president to defend a legal action immediately are balanced against the costs associated with making a plaintiff wait to pursue his or her cause of action. And while no solution is perfect, the flexible nature of the balancing process makes it possible to accommodate both sides of the scale in most cases."); see also POSNER, supra note 7, at 7 ( "The courts should not have proceeded with it until the end of Clinton's term of office."). 
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by Governor Clinton three years earlier. Clinton's lawyers argued that this civil suit should be temporarily suspended until the President was out of office. 66 But the courts disagreed and discovery proceeded. 67 On January 17, 1998, the President was deposed and Paula Jones' lawyers asked him about his relationship with an intern, Monica Lewinsky. Clinton denied having sexual relations with her. Shortly thereafter, in his January 26 press conference, he famously said: "I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky," 68 words that would come to haunt him. Second, also shortly after Clinton took office, an inquiry about a land deal in Whitewater, Arkansas arose. This inquiry led to the appointment of an Independent Counsel, first Robert 69 When the Lewinsky matter surfaced, Starr's mandate was expanded to include that investigation as well. 70 In the course of investigating the Lewinsky affair, Starr subpoenaed Clinton to appear before the grand jury. After much debate, Clinton decided to comply and on August 17, 1998, President Clinton gave four hours of videotaped testimony. 71 The questioning, conducted by Independent Counsel Starr and two of his deputies, took place in the Map Room of the White House. 72 Clinton's testimony was a mixture of regret for his indiscretions and anger at the investigators for relentlessly pursuing details about his personal life. Clinton acknowledged "inappropriate sexual contact" with Lewinsky but also angrily described the entire investigation as a politically motivated attempt to "set me up." 'We are only the grand jury,' said Representative Marge Roukema of Connecticut, one of a number of Republicans who intend to vote for impeachment without regard to possible Senate action. ' The Senate has to make that decision, and I don't think what the Senate does should have any influence on how we do the job.' Roukema said she takes 'strong exception' to other Republicans, such as Representative Christopher Shays of Connecticut, who have said they won't vote for impeachment unless they feel certain the Senate should convict Clinton. The outcome of the House vote could depend on whether undecided Republicans take the Roukema or Shays viewpoint.
Michael Kranish, Senate Coolness to Oust Clinton Emboldens Some, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1998 , at A25. See also the statement of Representative Ed Bryant of Tennessee, who said he did not regret voting to impeach and then serving as one of the impeachment managers, even though he knew they would never get enough votes in the Senate to convict Clinton. James W. Brosnan, Congressmen From Mid-South Size Up 106th; Thompson, Lott Voice Satisfaction, THE COM. 20 led the House to launch an impeachment inquiry. 75 Thereafter, without even viewing the video, the House Judiciary Committee decided to release the videotaped grand jury deposition on September 21, 1998, a decision that produced a media frenzy with CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News airing the entire testimony, unedited, at 9 a.m. on September 21. 76 Many in the House realized that the Senate was unlikely to convict but, nonetheless voted to impeach. They wanted to impeach, they said, to send a message. The comments of Representative Bill McCollum, a Republican from Florida, were typical:
The reality is that however serious these [charges] Dec. 17, 1998 , at A20. 79 Id. As Judge Posner noted: "Some of the moderate Republicans, whose votes to impeach President Clinton were essential, voted so in the hope and expectation that he would not be convicted by the Senate." POSNER, supra note 7, at 97. 80 The four Republican Representatives who voted for impeachment and urged the Senate not to convict were Sherwood Boehlert (NY), Benjamin Gilman (NY), Michael Castle (DE), and James Greenwood (PA). James Dao, Impeachment: The Moderates; 2 Votes in House are Defended as not in Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at A27 ("In explaining his position ..., Mr. Boehlert said that he always felt that Mr. Clinton had committed serious offenses, but not ones that warranted removal from office. He said he would have voted for a strong censure motion in the House, but the Republican leadership had not allowed such a bill to reach the floor. ... A spokesman for Mr. Gilman said the Congressman viewed the House's role as similar to a grand jury, which can indict but does not convict or sentence. He said Mr. Gilman felt that the President's behavior deserved some punishment short of removal, but that the Constitution allowed only the Senate to select the penalty."). Mr. Boehlert's statement seems to misunderstand that the Senate can only convict and remove, or acquit. His expressed preference that the Senate impose "some punishment short of removal" was appallingly uninformed. 81 Kranish, supra note 77, at A25.
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One Republican, Representative James Greenwood of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, found that knowing the Senate would acquit made it even easier to vote for impeachment: "If there were 67 senators over there waiting for this so that they could knock him out of office, this would be a much heavier decision. It's easier to flip the switch on the electric chair if it is not connected at the other end."
78 Echoing a similar nonchalance was Representative Clay Shaw, a Republican from Fort Lauderdale: "I will be very surprised if there is a trial in the Senate and, if there is, it will be a very short trial." It was "easier" to vote for impeachment under these circumstances, Shaw said, because the House was merely passing the charges to the Senate, which, he thought, was unlikely to convict Clinton and remove him from office. 79 Indeed, some moderate Republicans voted to impeach but then turned around and publicly urged the Senate not to convict. 80 This is not to say there were no Representatives who understood the gravity of the impeachment process and warned the House not to impeach frivolously. Representative Christopher Shays, a Republican from Connecticut, for example, said he would not vote for impeachment unless he felt certain that the Senate should convict and remove Clinton. 81 Similarly, Representative Paul McHale from Pennsylvania, one of the Democrats initially inclined to vote for impeachment, decided to abandon the impeachment effort and instead draft a censure resolution once he realized it was not likely to result in removing the President: "If, in fact, the outcome of the impeachment process is unlikely to affect the President's term in office, it is in the nation's best interest that we conclude the matter quickly and responsibly." 82 But the effort to impeach prevailed and on December 19, 1998, the House adopted two of the four proposed articles of impeachment. Articles I and III passed the full House and went on to become Articles I and II in the Senate. Article I, as adopted, accused Clinton of perjury, claiming that he had "willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration." 83 It then detailed Clinton's alleged efforts to mislead and derail the Independent Counsel's investigation and was adopted by a vote of 228 to 206. 84 Article III, ultimately Article II in the Senate, accused Clinton of obstruction of justice for attempting to stall the investigation into Paula Jones' sexual harassment charges. 85 It, too, was adopted but by a somewhat closer vote: 221 to 212. 86 The voting on both articles was partisan. 87 Representative Hyde, one of the leaders of the impeachment, had said that an impeachment could only succeed if it were bipartisan 88 and his prediction proved accurate.
During the 1986 trial of Judge Claiborne, the Senate rejected his motion to establish that the House managers had to prove his guilt 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' leaving the matter up to the conscience of each individual senator. Fla.) , said in a recent interview that he believes it is the proper standard. Others have argued for a slightly less stringent burden of proof, 'clear and convincing' evidence. And some have even suggested the burden applicable in civil cases, a mere 'preponderance of the evidence,' arguing that the purpose of impeachment and conviction is to protect the country from an individual unfit to hold public office and that the higher standards designed to make conviction difficult would interfere with that critical function.
Id.
A Nixon-era handbook on impeachment by Yale Law School professor Charles L. Black Jr. detailed the dilemma: "Removal by conviction on impeachment is a stunning penalty, the ruin of a life. Even more important it unseats the person the people have deliberately chosen for the 23 After the House adopted two of the four Articles of Impeachment, it appointed thirteen managers to bring the case to the Senate. Representative Henry Hyde led the managers 89 to the Senate where the trial began on January 14, 1999. The Senate adopted a number of procedures. They decided to conduct a two-week trial based on the documentary record, essentially the Starr Report, and thereafter decide whether to call any live witnesses. Ultimately, they agreed to call three witnesses for videotaped depositions-Monica Lewinsky, Sidney Blumenthal, and Vernon Jordan. 90 On the question of the appropriate burden of proof, the Senate declined to adopt a uniform standard. Instead, each Senator would decide independently on the appropriate burden of proof. 91 not considered "high crimes or misdemeanors."
96 Finally, in both the Johnson and Clinton impeachments, the Senate stepped up to its responsibility and refused to convict on what most saw as technical wrongs being used by political enemies to try to oust a president with whom they disagreed. All these principles seem correct to me.
What did we learn about the impact of public opinion? That is a more complicated story. President Johnson was unpopular and the public seemed to want him removed from office. But the Senate decided that popularity should be irrelevant and voted, but only by a one vote margin, to acquit. They were not going to remove the president on a technical violation of the law, especially a constitutionally suspect law. Nixon was also unpopular at the time of his proposed impeachment. But his unpopularity appeared to be attributable to his abuses of power, the basis for his impeachable offenses, not to policy differences. Clinton, by contrast, had the public behind him. Most of the country did not think he should be removed from office for lying about his sexual conduct. As Judge Posner observed:
From the polls that asked specifically whether President Clinton should be impeached, from the exit polls conducted after the November 1998 congressional elections, from the election campaigns and outcomes themselves, from the qualms of a number of Republican members of Congress about impeaching Clinton, and from the efforts of Republican Senators to truncate the Senate trial, it is apparent that a large majority of American did not want him impeached. 97 The public understood that impeachment and removal is a drastic measure that should be reserved for drastic abuses of power. The Senate wisely agreed.
In my opinion, the House and the Senate may consider public opinion in deciding whether to impeach and remove a president, but they should not do so when deciding the threshold question of whether the president has arguably committed an impeachable offense. The question of whether the alleged acts of the president are impeachable, that is may constitute "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," is a legal question that should be addressed without regard to public opinion. But if, and only if, that legal question is answered in the affirmative, public opinion can be considered. Thus, the threshold question should always be whether the president has arguably committed an impeachable offense. If he has not, public opinion is totally irrelevant; without an impeachable offense, the public's opinion should only be relevant at the next election. But if he has committed an impeachable offense, public opinion may legitimately play a role in the impeachment proceedings. If the public has lost confidence in the President's ability to preside and be commander in chief, then impeachment and removal may be appropriate. If, on the other hand, the public wants this person to continue to govern, that should be relevant information for the impeachment decision. 98 The three presidential impeachments we have experienced are consistent with this view. President Johnson's offenses did not warrant impeachment and removal, so the public's dislike for him should not have been relevant. And more than one-third of the Senate agreed. Nixon's offenses, by contrast, were clearly impeachable and public opinion concurred. Thus, he was appropriately subject to impeachment and removal. Finally, with Clinton, the question of the impeachability of his actions was a close call and therefore I think his support by the public was-and should have been-relevant. The public thought he should remain in office-and the Senate was appropriately influenced by that view. The House, unfortunately, was not listening.
All three experiences confirmed what Representative Henry Hyde asserted early in the Clinton impeachment: Impeachment cannot and should not be a partisan effort. Andrew Johnson's impeachment by the House was partisan and the Senate, in a bipartisan manner, refused to convict. Nixon's aborted impeachment and conviction would likely have been bipartisan. Clinton's impeachment by the House was highly partisan and the Senate fell far short of the necessary two-thirds vote to convict. Representative Hyde's view was clearly vindicated; indeed, reflecting upon the impeachment when he announced his retirement from the House in 2005, Representative Hyde indicated that, in hindsight, he was not sure he would repeat pursuing the impeachment. 99 Did we learn anything specifically from the Clinton impeachment? We clearly became acutely aware of the dangers of the Independent Counsel statute. In an earlier article, I evaluated the performances of all the actors in the impeachment drama and was particularly critical of the Office of the Independent Counsel. 100 In my view, the institution of Independent Counsel was seriously flawed, as Justice Scalia perspicaciously noted in his 1988 dissent in Morrison v. Olson . 101 A single-focused investigator with no budgetary or institutional constraints, especially one with no prosecutorial experience, is a misguided institution. Moreover, such an institution undermines executive power by limiting the President's ability to control a prosecutor. 102 As Justice Scalia noted:
An independent counsel is selected, and the scope of her authority prescribed, by a panel of judges. What if they are politically partisan, as judges have been known to be, and select a prosecutor antagonistic to the administration, or even to the particular individual who has been selected for this special treatment? There is no remedy for that, not even a political one....
Turning to the Senate's performance, Judge Posner called the Senate trial "truncated and anticlimactic-indeed, a parody of legal justice."
111 Judge Posner was particularly critical of the Senators' publicly commenting on their views before and during the trial. In his view, they should have imposed a gag order on themselves. 112 My assessment of the Senate's performance is more generous. 113 In my view, the Senate performed the safety-valve function for which it was designed: to make sure that it was appropriate to remove the democratically elected President of the United States. In both the Clinton and Johnson trials, the Senate cautiously decided that burden had not been met. That was the role given the Senate and one which it appropriately exercised in both cases.
Overall, evaluating the Clinton impeachment from a post-September 11, 2001 perspective should teach us how much we need a full-time, undistracted Commander in Chief. Even though President Clinton's remarkable ability to "compartmentalize" might lead some to underestimate the level of distraction most Presidents would experience during an impeachment, we should not be so misled. Impeachment is a drastic remedy and should be reserved for serious abuses of power.
Fortunately, as noted, we got rid of the Independent Counsel statute when Congress allowed it to sunset in 1999. Thus, we are unlikely to see a repeat convergence of a "Paula Jones" type suit intersecting with a "Whitewater" type independent counsel investigation. 114 Further, with some luck, we may be spared another "Paula Jones" type suit altogether. But that will require not only better behavior by presidents and would-be presidents, but a reconsideration of the Supreme Court's decision to allow the Paula Jones' case to proceed while the president was still in office. Surely the Supreme Court justices must have had some second thoughts about the wisdom of that decision in which they let the suit go forward because, in their words, "properly managed" the suit would not take that much of the president's time. 115 Judge Posner certainly got it right: An important lesson is the inability of a Supreme Court, none of whose members has substantial political experience, to deal adequately with cases that have a heavy political charge. In retrospect the Court's decisions upholding the constitutionality of the independent counsel law and allowing Paula Jones's suit against the president to go forward before he left office appear as naive, unintended, unpragmatic, and gratuitous body blows to the Presidency. Had either decision gone the other way-or even if the decision had been written more narrowly . . . -Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky, an affair intrinsically devoid of any significance to anyone except Lewinsky, would have remained a secret from the public. The public would not have been the worse for not knowing about it. There would have been no impeachment inquiry, no impeachment, no concerns about the motives behind the President's military actions against terrorists and rogue states in the summer and fall of 1998, no spectacle of the United States Senate play-acting at adjudication. The Supreme Court's decision created a situation that led the President and his defenders into the pattern of cornered-rat behavior that engendered a constitutional storm and that may have embittered American politics, weakened the Presidency, distracted the federal government from essential business, and undermined the rule of law. 116 In my opinion, the Senate's ultimate acquittal of Clinton was the correct outcome. But I also believe the country should have been spared the whole impeachment ordeal: The House should never have impeached him.
Is there anything more we can do now to avoid another abuse of the impeachment mechanism? Would a constitutional amendment help? I don't think so. I'm not sure what such an amendment would say. The constitutional mechanism appears to be good-and has worked well for most of our 200-plus years of experience. I think our best approach is education-educating the public, the media, and members of Congress. We should reflect on the purposes of the impeachment device and how it can be abused. Congress should also consider adopting some neutral standards to be used in the event of future impeachments. That is the best way to learn from history-in the calm before the next storm.
